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Abstract 
 
The paper adapts a static model of television advertising into a dynamic scenario. In 
its  original  form,  the  model  consists  on  a  profit  maximization  problem  of  a  television 
network  working  in  a  competitive  environment.  The  network  sells  commercial  time  to 
advertisers  and  tries  to  minimize  the  effects  of  viewers’  aversion  to  ads.  Viewers  are 
assumed heterogeneous with regard to the preferences over the types of products companies 
sell through ad time. Into this framework we introduce an intertemporal rule reflecting the 
possible preference changes of consumers (these are boundedly rational and their utility for 
different types of products varies over time). The introduction of the intertemporal rule 
originates interesting dynamic results, namely in what concerns the evolution over time of 
crucial variables like the total time of broadcasting that networks allocate to advertising or 
the amount of revenues that satisfies the profit maximization condition. As in the original 
model,  attention  will  be  given  to  the  possibility,  that  cable  television  allows,  of  ad 
addressability.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The relevance of advertising revenues in the television network business justifies 
the  need  for  a  theoretical  framework  aimed  at  explaining  the  connection  between 
networks’ contents and the relationship that media establish between consumers with 
distinct preferences and firms who wish to advertise the products they sell.  
Various models explore such connections. Some of the most prominent include 
the  path  breaking  work  by  Steiner  (1952),  in  his  specific  case  regarding  radio 
broadcasting, and recent contributions like Goettler (1999), McDowell and Sunderland 
(2000),  Esteban,  Gil  and  Hernandez  (2001),  Kieshnick,  McCullough  and  Wildman 
(2001), Byzalov and Shachar (2004), Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2004), Peitz 
and  Valletti  (2004)  and  Anderson  and  Gabszewicz  (2005),  among  others.  This 
theoretical work follows on the footsteps of important empirical contributions, which 
address some illustrative case studies: Smith (1999) analyzes advertising profitability 
for other media besides television and radio broadcasting (in particular, he addresses 
the market for non daily newspapers); Sonnac (2000) looks as well to advertising in the 
press, studying in detail the attitude of consumers towards ads; Fare, Grosskopf, Seldon 
and Tremblay (2004), and Reid, King, Martin and Soh (2005) search for evidence on 
the effectiveness of media advertising  and the  degree in which television is in this 
respect a substitute relatively to other media. 
The present paper explores further and illustrates numerically and graphically one 
of  the  existing  advertising  models,  namely  the  Kim  and  Wildman  (2006)  model, 
henceforth KW. In its basic structure, this theoretical framework explores the profit 
maximization behaviour of a representative television network. Assuming that costs are 
constant (i.e., in this case, independent from advertising time, which is the endogenous 
variable of the model), the profit maximization becomes a revenue maximization setup, 
where revenues are essentially determined by the decisions of the network concerning 
the time of broadcasting that is destined to be sold to advertisers.  
Two conflicting forces are taken in consideration in this problem: the revenues 
generated by selling advertising time and the loss of viewers that occurs when ad time 
is  raised,  given  that  viewers  are  considered  as  disliking  commercials.  The  loss  of 
viewers is interpreted in two ways: first, when ad time is augmented, individuals simply 
change network, and this has a direct impact on the amount of ad time networks can sell 
to advertisers; second, if one considers a subscription television service (cable TV), as 
the network rises ad time it will lose paying clients. The Dynamics of Television Advertising  3 
 
The main feature of the KW model is the fact that it considers heterogeneous 
television  viewers.  These  are  not  necessarily  heterogeneous  in  what  concerns  their 
tastes about TV programs, but they distinguish themselves in what concerns the type of 
commodities  they  generally  acquire.  Therefore,  one  will  encounter  as  well  various 
types  of  firms  that  advertise  their  goods  trying  to  target  the  viewers  that  reveal  a 
preference for such goods. The heterogeneity assumption has important consequences 
over the solution of the maximization problem, namely regarding the optimal profit 
level  and  the  time  of  broadcasting  time  that,  in  the  optimum,  is  allocated  to 
commercials. 
This  theoretical  framework  gains  a  new  appeal  when  we  acknowledge  the 
possibilities that the digital cable television supply. In particular, new technologies are 
now  achieving  two  relevant  results:  they  can  help  in  collecting  information  about 
consumers’ tastes and preferences and they are beginning to turn it possible to target 
advertising, that is, the same advertising time can be used to send different commercial 
information  to  different  types  of  consumers.  The  combination  of  these  two  factors 
implies  the  possibility  of  selling  the  same  advertising  time  to  different  types  of 
producers, what has unambiguous advantages to the network’s profit objective. The 
possibility of ad addressability has also effects over the total commercial time in a 
competitive  market  environment,  but  these  effects  are  not  clear  a  priori;  they  will 
depend on the specific assumptions and structure of the model. 
The KW model furnishes a benchmark tool to the study of the relation between 
television networks programming policies and  the role of advertising  and it can be 
extended in multiple directions. In this paper, one of such directions is explored. We 
introduce  a  dynamic  setup  by  considering  that  consumer  preferences  over  different 
types of goods change intertemporally, given three types of effects: first, we consider a 
constant rate of utility appreciation / depreciation. Individuals do not have to maintain 
forever the same degree of utility from a type of good. They can progressively like it 
more or like it less. This rate translates such an effect. Second, there is an imitation or 
diffusion effect that leads each individual to prefer  a kind of  good that others also 
prefer.  Third,  the  imitation  effect  can  be  overcome  by  a  conspicuous  consumption 
effect  [see  Benhabib  and  Bisin  (2002)]:  when  individuals  realize  that  many  other 
individuals  also  consume  that  good,  their  preference  for  it  may  drop  down  as  the 
consumption no longer represents outstanding status. 
The previous three effects are associated to a bounded rationality mechanism that 
works through a discrete choice rule [see McFadden (1973), Manski and McFadden The Dynamics of Television Advertising  4 
 
(1982)  and  Anderson,  de  Palma  and  Thisse  (1991)].  This  choice  rule  has  proved 
important  in  explaining  other  economic  phenomena,  like  the  working  of  financial 
markets  [Brock  and  Hommes  (1998),  Gaunersdorfer  (2000)]  or  how  heterogeneous 
inflation expectations contribute to endogenous business cycles [Branch and McGough 
(2006), Gomes (2006), Gomes, Mendes, Mendes and Sousa Ramos (2006)]. 
The  dynamic  framework  regarding  consumers  /  viewers’  preferences  with  the 
previous properties reveals a very rich set of long run equilibrium properties: a fixed 
point stable steady state is accomplishable for some sets of parameter values, but for 
others, also reasonable,  sets of parameter values cycles of various periodicities and 
even chaotic motion is encountered. Thus, one may have a long term time series for 
viewers preferences about commodities that, although being determined under a purely 
deterministic  setup,  exhibits  fluctuations,  and  therefore  it  becomes  difficult  or  even 
impossible  to  predict  how  viewers  will  behave  in  the  long  run  with  respect  to  the 
products they wish to acquire.  
Because consumer preferences are a central piece in the representative network 
revenue function (networks sell ad time to advertisers under the assumption that these 
only pay advertising directed to the viewers potentially interested in acquiring their 
goods), the possible periodic or a-periodic long term results will also characterize the 
evolution over time of the share of programming time dedicated to advertising and the 
revenues of the network.  
The main novelty over the KW model that this new assumption about dynamic 
preferences under bounded rationality allows is that there is the possibility of becoming 
unfeasible to determine exactly how much the network will spend in advertising time 
and how much will be the optimal profit in the long run. 
The model will be explored mainly through numerical examples and graphical 
illustrations  because  general  results  about  global  dynamics  are  not  determinable. 
Nevertheless,  the  sensitivity  analysis  will  be  able  to  reveal  some  meaningful 
regularities. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic 
structure  of  the  KW  model,  section  3  presents  the  intertemporal  mechanics  of 
preferences over a bounded rationality scenario; dynamic properties of the model are 
discussed  in  sections  4  and  5;  section  4  treats  the  conventional  case  of  ad  non 
addressability;  section  5  explores  the  targeted  commercials  case.  Section  6  briefly 
discusses another insight: the possibility of dynamic preferences not only over products 
but also over programs. Finally, section 7 concludes.    The Dynamics of Television Advertising  5 
 
 
2. The Kim-Wildman Model 
 
As stated in the introduction, the KW model furnishes the basic structure for our 
analysis  of  television  advertising  in  the  presence  of  intertemporal  changes  in 
consumers’ preferences. We briefly review the structure of the model.  
The baseline idea is that a finite number of networks (i.e., programming service 
providers) compete for revenues, which come from two sources: advertisers and final 
consumers (viewers). Networks obey to some symmetry conditions: (i) production costs 
are fixed and equal to all networks (every network maximizes profits by maximizing 
revenues); (ii) viewers can change from one network to another, but it is supposed that 
they do not abandon the market, that is, when one network loses viewers, these will 
continue to watch television distributed equally among all the other service providers; 
(iii) networks are Cournot competitors in the sense that their business decisions are 
taken on the assumption of no change in the behaviour of competitors.  
The  last  of  the  previous  assumptions  allows  us  to  consider  a  representative 
network,  relatively  to  which  one  is  able  to  analyze  optimizing  behaviour  (the  other 
networks will operate in a same way). 
Consumers or viewers are separated in two groups. This separation has nothing to 
do  with  tastes  regarding  programs  that  are  broadcasted  by  networks  [another 
simplification of the model is that viewers are indifferent regarding networks’ contents, 
as long as the time of effective (without ads) program service provided by each one of 
them  is  the  same].  The  distinction  is  associated  with  the  final  consumption  role  of 
viewers  and  the  way  they  are  affected  by  advertising.  Following  the  original 
formulation,  we  distinguish  between  right-handed  viewers  (RH)  and  left-handed 
viewers  (LH).  They  consume  different  bundles  of  goods:  goods  RH  and  LH, 
respectively. There is also a finite number of firms in the market that sell and advertise 
the two sets of goods; thus, firms are also of two types. 
Let at be the share of viewers that in a given moment t prefer to acquire goods RH 
(accordingly, 1-at is the share of LH type viewers). Differently from the KW model, 
one is assuming an intertemporal setup (that will be discussed in the next section), and 
therefore subscript t allows us to locate ourselves in time.
1 
                                                 
1  We should be careful in our analysis with the use of the term ‘time’. The problem is intertemporal, and 
therefore there is a sequence of time periods from t=0 until a non specified moment in the future. Each 
period  contains  a  unit  of  time  that  can  be  divided  between  the  effective  broadcasting  of  television The Dynamics of Television Advertising  6 
 
Advertisers RH and LH will pay to the representative network to broadcast their 
commercials; they pay rR(aRt) and rL(aLt), respectively. In these revenue functions, aRt 
and aLt are the amounts of programming time the network allocates in each time period 
to commercials of each type. Following KW, the revenue functions will display positive 
and diminishing returns to ad time,  given the intuitive idea that repeating the same 
message over and over again has a marginal decreasing effect over consumers and, thus, 
firms will not be willing to pay the same for each additional unit of time on the air. 
Because our model becomes hard to analyze once we introduce the intertemporal 
component,  we  will  work  with  specific  functional  forms.  In  the  present  case,  the 
following functions are considered: 
q r Rt R Rt R a a r × = ) (  and 
q r Lt L Lt L a a r × = ) ( , rR,rL>0, 
0<q<1. These functions clearly obey the specified conditions r’>0 and r’’<0. 
Having understood how advertisers contribute to the network’s revenues, we must 
look now to the viewers’ side. If we have considered a free television service acting in a 
monopolistic market and if there were no legal constraints to how much advertising a 
TV station could transmit, the network’s revenue would be maximized with a level of 
commercials  that  were  certainly  above  a  social  optimum  value.  But  our  model  is 
different from this extreme scenario in several ways. We are working with a competitive 
market  and  we  make  the  reasonable  assumption  that  viewers  dislike  commercials. 
Furthermore, we take the additional assumption that viewers pay to watch television (a 
subscription cable TV service is considered). Under this scenario, two effects arise: (i) 
the license fee of the network decreases when time dedicated to commercials rise (i.e., 
the amount a viewer is willing to pay to access a channel falls with advertising time); 
(ii) as individuals can switch from one network to the others, the network will lose 
viewers for other networks if it rises commercials time. 
These  two  effects  can  be  translated  analytically.  The  first  will  be  given  by  a 
function  f(at),  with  at  the  total  time  of  advertising  in  each  period  that  a  network 
transmits.  The  function  relates  to  the  per  subscriber  fee  collected  by  the  network; 
obviously, this fee falls with a rise in at, so that f’<0. An admissible functional form for 
this function is  t t a a f / ) ( j = , with j>0. The second effect states that there is a function 
s(at)  that  defines  the  network’s  share  of  all  viewers,  in  such  a  way  that  s’<0.  We 
consider 
w s
- × = t t a a s ) ( , with s>0 and 0<w<1. 
                                                                                                                                               
programs and advertising. Therefore, the term ‘advertising time’ will be generally used to designate the 
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As  stated  previously,  the  optimization  problem  of  the  network  is,  in  fact,  a 
problem of revenue maximization. In each moment of time, the representative network 
solves problem (1).
2 
 
[ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) , (   t Lt L t Rt R t t Lt Rt a f V a r a r a s V a a R Max × + × - + × × × = a a   (1) 
 
In (1), parameter V defines the total number of television viewers. 
The way in which we will solve problem (1) depends on two features. The first 
feature  is  related  to  the  adopted  notion  of  dynamics.  We  will  introduce  a  temporal 
dimension  by  considering  that  at  varies  in  time.  This  is,  in  the  original  model,  a 
constant, and in our formulation a state variable (the network is unable to control its 
evolution). Therefore, the control variables for the network continue to be the same as in 
the KW model: the ad time the service provider can sell to each firm. In this sense, from 
the network point of view, the problem continues to be static: problem (1) can be solved 
in exactly the same way in all time periods from today to infinity. The second main 
feature is associated with a central piece of the argument of KW, that is, the possible 
addressability of advertising time. 
In its conventional form, television can only provide untargeted (non addressable) 
advertising. Untargeted commercials are delivered to the whole audience, independently 
of  the  type  of  consumers.  In  its  traditional  form,  television  is  unable  to  separate 
audiences and to furnish to each audience the advertisements relating to the goods they 
frequently purchase. In terms of the network business, the main consequence of the non 
addressability property of television is that the same units of commercial time cannot be 
occupied  by  more  than  one  advertiser.  The  translation  of  this  idea  to  our  model  is 
straightforward:  the  total  ad  time  is  just  the  sum  of  the  time  sold  to  each  type  of 
advertiser, that is, at=aRt+aLt; in this case, we define a new variable ut that is the share 
of ad time associated to RH advertisers, so that aRt=ut×at and aLt=(1-ut)×at. Problem (1) 
can be restated for the particular case of non addressability as follows, 
 
[ ] ) ( ) ) 1 (( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) , (   t t t L t t t R t t t t
U a f V a u r a u r a s V u a R Max × + × - × - + × × × × = a a   (2) 
 
                                                 
2  For a similar presentation of revenues maximization see the original KW model. The Dynamics of Television Advertising  8 
 
The  advantage  of  analyzing  (2),  over  (1),  is  that  only  two  control  variables, 
relatively to which we should maximize R
U, are present: the total time of advertising 
and the share of advertising time associated to one of the goods’ types. 
New technologies applied to cable television are beginning to make advertising 
addressable. If, by any means, networks and advertisers are able to compile information 
about  the  preferences  of  consumers  and  if  television  addressability  technology  is 
available, it will be possible to sell the same advertising time two times, that is, to the 
two types of goods providers. The simultaneous delivery of distinct commercials to 
different viewers implies relevant changes in the model; now, advertising time becomes 
non rival, that is, the same advertising time can be simultaneously sold to both types of 
producers / advertisers. If we consider the limit case where all commercial time can be 
targeted,  then  aRt=at  and  aLt=at,  turning  the  maximization  problem  into  the  one  in 
expression (3), 
 
[ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) (   t t L t t R t t t
T a f V a r a r a s V a R Max × + × - + × × × = a a   (3) 
 
As in the benchmark KW model, one of the purposes of the analysis consists in 
comparing untargeted and targeted ads scenarios. It is relevant to understand how total 
time  of  advertising  varies  between  the  two  cases  and  how  the  targeting  possibility 
affects optimal revenues. After characterizing consumer preferences in the next section, 
we will derive and compare such results.  
 
3. The Dynamics of Consumer Preferences 
 
Although we have included time subscripts into variables on last section’s model, 
this was presented essentially as a static one period problem. In this section, we turn the 
model dynamic by deriving a difference equation that describes the motion in time of 
variable at. Recall that at is the share of viewers / consumers that prefer to acquire RH 
products and therefore react essentially to advertisement of this type of goods. Now we 
allow preferences to change. They will not change as a result of advertising (we assume 
that advertising has the ability to stimulate the viewer to buy a larger quantity of the 
product that the viewer already prefers, but it has no capacity to change preferences); 
instead, preferences will change given a set of three effects and a bounded rationality 
mechanism.  The Dynamics of Television Advertising  9 
 
Let  QRt  and  QLt  be  the  utility  withdrawn  by  one  consumer  from  potentially 
purchasing RH and LH goods, respectively. These utility values will change given three 
effects: 
i)  A  depreciation  /  appreciation  of  utility  effect:  households  can  gain  or  lose 
interest  in  acquiring  a  good  independently  of  any  other  factor  besides  their  own 
subjective perception of the good’s quality; 
ii) A network / imitation effect: this occurs  when individuals withdraw higher 
utility when the share of consumers interested in the goods in question rise. This effect 
generally occurs for a relatively low level of the referred share; 
iii) A conspicuous consumption effect: when the share of individuals consuming 
the goods is high, as it rises even further individuals may want to consume less of the 
goods  because  it  is  no  longer  a  symbol  of  status  to  acquire  them;  consumers  will 
outstand if they become interested on the other, less preferred, good. 
To better understand the second and third effects, figure 1 presents two diagrams 
where the imitation and conspicuous properties are depicted. As we have stated, for a 
given  individual  the  variation  on  utility  is  determined  by  the  share  of  consumers  / 
viewers that already show preference for the good: first, the imitation process leads the 
individual consumer to ‘follow the mob’ and to withdraw higher utility just because 
other individuals are beginning to prefer that good or goods. After some point (that here 
we consider at=0.5 to simplify computation and analysis, but that does not need to be 
exactly  this  value),  the  conspicuous  effect  dominates:  each  consumer  will  be  less 
interested  in  the  good,  i.e.,  he  will  attribute  less  utility  to  it,  because  the  act  of 
consumption will no longer allow him to outstand relatively to other  consumers.  In 
figure 1, the left diagram relates to utility changes regarding goods of type RH; the right 
diagram is concerned with goods of type LH. 
 
Figure 1 
  
Note in figure 1 that if the share of individuals preferring one or the other type of 
goods is very low or very high, then utility varies negatively, and it will vary positively 
if the number of consumers preferring each type of good is an intermediate value. 
The functions in figure  1 can be translated analytically. Equations (4) and (5) 
present  the  utility  variation  functions,  including  the  three  referred  effects.  These 
equations are the ones presented in the figure, plus a last term in the right hand side of 
each equation that corresponds to the utility appreciation / depreciation  effect that is The Dynamics of Television Advertising  10 
 
independent  from  share  a;  it  only  depends  on  the  own  dynamics  regarding  each 
consumer formation of preferences. 
 
0    given,      , ) 1 ( 8 0 1 > + - - × = - + m Q Q m m Q Q R Rt t t Rt Rt m a a   (4) 
 
0    given,      , ) 1 ( 8 0 1 > + - - × = - + n Q Q n n Q Q L Lt t t Lt Lt m a a   (5) 
 
If m=0, in (4) and (5), these equations are just the ones presented in figure 1, 
which are able to address the issues regarding the way individual utility is dependent on 
the share of individuals with exactly the same preferences. Considering parameter m a 
positive or negative real number, we are stating that in consumer preferences there is a 
natural tendency for preferring more (m>0) or less (m<0) of each type of good over 
time. 
To complete the dynamic preferences framework, we have to select a preference 
change  rule.  Equations  (4)  and  (5)  give  the  evolution  of  utility  values.  If  one  just 
considers a full rationality setup, each consumer would evaluate and compare utility 
results in every moment of time and choose RH when QRt>QLt and LH when QLt>QRt. 
Instead of full rationality, we assume that individuals are boundedly rational, that is, the 
share of consumers choosing one of the types of goods is given by the discrete choice 
rule  
 
) exp( ) exp(
) exp(
Lt Rt
Rt
t bQ bQ
bQ
+
= a   (6) 
 
Regard  that  at  can  be,  in  this  case,  simultaneously  interpreted  as  the  share  of 
individuals  preferring  RH  goods  or  the  probability  of  each  individual  choosing  RH 
goods instead of LH goods. Parameter b assumes a special relevance in (6). It is known 
as the intensity of choice and it is a non negative value. When b is close to zero, such 
implies a low degree of rationality, in the sense that consumers will not tend to change 
preferences even though the non selected set of goods gives systematically better utility 
results over time. For high values of the intensity of choice, the probability of changing 
preferences as the utility results vary becomes higher. This can be interpreted as an 
increase on the degree of rationality (such that when b®¥, we would be on the case of 
complete  rationality),  but  it  is  also  sometimes  interpreted,  specially  in  the  finance The Dynamics of Television Advertising  11 
 
literature, as a case where individuals just adopt a herd behaviour, without weighting all 
the benefits and costs of changing preferences between types of goods [see Hirshleifer 
(2001)]. 
From equations (4), (5) and (6), it is possible to withdraw a difference equation 
that characterizes the evolution of share a over time (eliminating from the analysis, in 
this way, the utility variables). One reaches equation (7) (an appendix at the end of the 
paper derives this equation), 
 
[ ] ( )
 



 



- - × × - × ×  


 

 -
+ =
+
+ 1 ) 1 ( 8 ) ( exp
1
1 1
1
1 t t
t
t
t m n b a a
a
a
a
m
  (7) 
 
Equation (7) is a rule of preferences switching derived from a set of reasonable 
assumptions  about  human  behaviour.  The  introduction  of  such  a  rule  into  the 
advertising model of section 2 allows for adding a dynamic component to the model 
with various implications that are important to discuss. In dynamic models we may 
distinguish between transitional dynamics, the period that goes from the initial state to a 
stationary long run state, and the steady state, where some regularities are observable 
and  that  can  be  interpreted  as  a  state  that  does  not  suffer  any  qualitative  relevant 
changes unless some external disturbance occurs. 
In the following sections, we will be mainly concerned with the long term state of 
the model, after the transition phase is fulfilled, that is, we will analyze the long run 
scenario that remains unchanged unless some shock over parameter values succeeds. 
Nevertheless, we must remark that it is not the same thing to analyze a static setup as 
the original KW model and the long run steady state of a dynamic model. This last state 
is reached only because there is a past history that gave rise to it. Past periods are not 
forgotten;  by  the  contrary,  they  are  the  ones  that  allowed  for  the  existence  of  the 
achieved state. This remark is important when addressing the model’s results in the next 
sections. 
    
4. Long Run Results with Untargeted Commercials 
 
In this and in the  following sections we study the KW model as described in 
section  2,  given  preference  dynamics  as  characterized  in  section  3.  We  begin  by 
considering  the  case  in  which  ad  addressability  is  not  feasible,  that  is,  the  case  of 
untargeted commercials. This is the case translated into expression (2). Recall that the The Dynamics of Television Advertising  12 
 
television network controls both the total time of advertising that is sold in each period 
and the share of commercials time that is attributed to each type of advertisers. Hence, 
revenues maximization implies, in this case, solving  0 = ¶
¶
t
U
u
R  and  0 = ¶
¶
t
U
a
R . 
Making the computation for the specific functional forms that were assumed, one 
gets 
 

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
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
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

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
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Expression (8) reveals the optimal share of ad time allocated to advertisers RH. 
We  immediately  observe  the  intuitive  result  that  the  higher  the  number  of  viewers 
preferring goods RH, the larger will be the relative amount of ads of this type of goods 
that are broadcasted by the network, in order for this to maximize profits.  
Relatively to the total time of advertising per period, result (9) indicates that such 
time is dependent on shares ut and 1-ut and that we must assume the condition q>w in 
order to assure a positive value for the total advertising time, that is, positive returns on 
advertising time sold have to be more pronounced than negative returns on the loss of 
viewers to other channels as a result of increasing advertising time. 
If there were no changes in preferences across periods, it would be straightforward 
to interpret (8) and (9). With the setup introduced in section 3 we lose in simplicity but 
gain in richness of results. To obtain meaningful conclusions it is necessary to consider 
specific  numerical  examples.  We  take,  for  now,  the  following  benchmark  vector  of 
parameter values: [V s w q rR rL j m n b m]=[1,000; 1; 0.1; 0.25; 0.75; 0.5; 1; 3; 1; 
2.75; 0.5]. Some of these values will be changed or allowed to vary, along the analysis. 
The initial value of at must also be defined (0<a0<1). 
Only the last four parameters have impact over the model’s dynamics, since these 
are the ones on equation (7), that defines the evolution of preferences. The others will 
just allow to determine the amount of total advertising time, the share of time allocated 
to commercials of each type and the total level of revenue of the network in each period. 
Thus, we begin by describing the motion underlying the preference dynamics equation. The Dynamics of Television Advertising  13 
 
To characterize the dynamics of (7), we present two bifurcation diagrams.
3 Figures 
2 and 3 take the above vector of parameter values and make parameters b and m to vary, 
respectively. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 
 
The bifurcation diagrams, which are drawn for the 1,000 observations after the 
first 1,000 transients, clearly indicate that a fixed point steady state result is not the only 
possible long term outcome. Cycles of various orders and total a-periodicity (chaotic 
motion) are found as well for several values of parameters. When the intensity of choice 
is  varied  (maintaining  all  the  other  values  as  given  in  the  benchmark  vector),  we 
observe  that  a  fixed  point  result  exists  for  b  lower  than  2.1  (roughly),  and  that  a 
bifurcation follows implying a period two cycle, which is broken for b around 2.5, 
giving place to a period 4 cycle. Cycles of other periodicities are observed as well, and 
for values of b between 2.7 and 3.1 and between 3.6 and 4.4 we regard that we have 
mostly situations of full a-periodicity, in the sense that our endogenous variable can 
possess any value of the ones indicated in the figure.  
Relatively to figure 3, a same kind of interpretation is possible. When varying the 
appreciation / depreciation of utility parameter multiple possibilities about steady state 
dynamics arise. In particular, we should note that in this specific case chaotic motion is 
found for both the possibility of utility appreciation and utility depreciation. Note, for 
instance, that after a given value of utility appreciation, the degree of predictability of 
the system rises as a-periodicity gives place to cycles of progressively lower order until 
reaching a fixed point result. 
The  presence  of  cycles  indicates  that  a  fully  deterministic  rule  of  preferences 
dynamics,  such  as  (7),  does  not  produce  a  unique  invariant  long  run  result:  the 
preferences share will alternate between two or more steady state outcomes (in cases of 
two period cycles or other periodic cycles), or it can follow a time series that does not 
display any kind of identifiable regularity, that is, it can follow a chaotic pattern. 
Figures 4 and 5 present, for the chosen vector of values of parameters, a phase 
diagram  and  a  time  series.  With  the  time  series  it  becomes  clear  that  the  selected 
example implies the presence of endogenous fluctuations (this is the long run behaviour 
                                                 
3  The program used to draw these and all the following figures is iDMC (interactive Dynamical Model 
Calculator). This is a free software program available at www.dss.uniud.it/nonlinear, and copyright of 
Marji Lines and Alfredo Medio. The Dynamics of Television Advertising  14 
 
of the preferences share, drawn after withdrawing the first 1,000 observations). The 
phase diagram may be used to understand that in this case the equilibrium is not stable 
or unstable; the time series will just gravitate forever around the steady state value [To 
confirm  this  just  draw  a  45  degrees  line,  select  an  initial  value  for  the  endogenous 
variable and draw successive vertical lines from the 45 degree line to the function and 
horizontal lines from the presented function to the 45 degrees line. You will see that the 
steady state (the points in the intersection between the line and the function) is never 
accomplished, but a divergence process away from the steady state is not observed as 
well]. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 
 
A rigorous confirmation of the presence of chaotic motion in the case we are 
considering requires the computation of the Lyapunov characteristic exponent (LCE) 
associated to equation (7).
4 A positive value of the LCE for a one equation system 
means that nearby orbits diverge exponentially or, in other words, there is sensitive 
dependence  on  the  initial  condition  (SDIC).  This  coincides  with  the  most  widely 
accepted  definition  of  chaotic  motion:  chaos  relates  to  the  fact  of  two  trajectories 
departing from two points close to each other following completely different orbits. In 
the present case, for the selected set of parameter values, we confirm the presence of 
chaotic motion: LCE=0.426. 
As it is clear from expressions (8) and (9), advertising optimal results are heavily 
dependent  on  preferences.  If  these  do  not  obey  to  a  fixed  point  result  in  every 
circumstance, then cycles and chaos will be also reflected on the long term values of 
variables ut, at and Rt
U. Sticking with our benchmark case, figures 6, 7 and 8 present the 
time trajectories for these variables. These will be compared with the results for the 
targeted commercials case of the next section. 
 
Figures 6, 7, 8 
 
Note that each one of the figures 6 to 8 is drawn for 100 observations after the first 
1,000. The presence of chaotic motion governing preferences makes the long term of 
each one of the advertising model variables to be subject to endogenous fluctuations. 
                                                 
4    This  computation  is  done  using  iDMC.  See  Medio  and  Lines  (2001)  about  the  meaning  and 
computation of LCEs. The Dynamics of Television Advertising  15 
 
For the concrete example, the share of advertising time sold to producers of type RH 
fluctuates around 0.75 and 1 (approximately); the total ad time varies between 6.75 and 
a value a little above 8 (we have not defined a unit for the ad time variable, but this can 
be thought as daily advertising broadcasting hours); and the total revenue will fluctuate 
between 950 and 1150 monetary units. 
 
5. Long Run Results with Targeted Commercials 
 
The possibility of ad addressability opens new opportunities for networks and for 
advertisers. From the point of view of the network, it seems obvious that the possibility 
of selling the same advertising time to two types of firms (or more) will have a positive 
impact over profits. A not so obvious result relates to the time allocated to advertising: 
will this grow or decline? In the present model, absolute answers cannot be presented, 
but we can study the subject under our benchmark case and related scenarios. In what 
follows, we confirm the positive impact of targeted commercials over revenues and 
inquire about the time spent with advertising. 
We  solve  maximization  problem  (3),  that  is,  we  derive  an  optimal  level  of 
advertising time from the condition  0 = ¶
¶
t
T
a
R . The outcome is  
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Expression (10) is similar to (9), but now variable ut disappears as a result of the 
addressability assumption. Once again it is fundamental that condition q>w holds.  
Using the same benchmark example with chaotic preferences as in the previous 
section, we characterize the targeted ads case dynamics with the presentation of figures 
9 and 10, that reveal how the total ad time and the network’s profits evolve in the long 
run. These time series should be compared with the ones in figures 7 and 8. To better 
make this comparison, we display two additional figures (figures 11 and 12). 
 
Figures 9, 10, 11, 12. 
 
From figures 11 and 12 we observe that, for the case in appreciation, advertising 
time falls when advertising is addressable and we confirm the rise in revenue that is The Dynamics of Television Advertising  16 
 
intuitively true. The blue dashed lines in these two figures show the case in which the 
targeted  and  untargeted  ad  cases  would  furnish  the  same  results.  Although  chaotic 
motion exists, we regard that ad time effectively observed points are always below the 
dashed line, meaning that to maximize profits under ad addressability it is not necessary 
to  broadcast  so  much  commercials  as  in  the  conventional  non  addressability  case. 
Furthermore, chaos does not distort in any way the revenues result; we see that the 
corresponding set of points (the long run attractor) is always above the dashed line, and 
therefore  ad  addressability  means  an  optimal  result  where  revenues  are  higher  with 
lower  advertising  time.  If  one  could  generalize  this  result,  one  might  say  that  ad 
addressability does not only benefit the network but also the viewer, who can assess 
more broadcasting time without advertising. 
To  attempt  to  generalize  the  previous  results  we  present  table  1,  where  we 
compare ad time and profits between addressability and non addressability cases, for 
various sets of parameter values. 
 
Values of 
parameters 
Type of 
dynamics 
at
U  at
T  Rt
U  Rt
T 
Benchmark  Chaos  6.75-8.10  6.7-7.3  950-1,140  1,055-1,145 
b=2  Fixed point  7.21  6.88  1,063  1,113 
b=3.5  Period 6  6.68; 6.69; 
6.85; 6.92; 
9.13; 9.25 
6.68; 6.69; 
6.74; 6.77; 
7.86; 7.94 
829; 840; 
1,108;1,119; 
1,145;1,146 
965; 976; 
1,132;1,137; 
1,146;1,147  
m=0.75  Period 2  6.91; 7.45  6.77; 6.98  1,029; 1,110  1,097; 1,133 
m=-0.25  Chaos  6.71-9.9  6.69-8.9  775-1,143  859-1,145 
m=0.1  Fixed point  9.8  9.3  786  826 
m=3.3  Period 3  6.7; 6.86; 
8.71 
6.69; 6.75; 
7.6 
880; 1,118; 
1,145 
1,009;1,137; 
1,146 
n=0.5  Period 3  6.69; 6.87; 
9.15  
6.69; 6.75; 
7.87 
838; 1,116; 
1,145 
974; 1,136; 
1,146 
n=2  Fixed point  7.07  6.83  1,085  1,123 
j=0.5  Chaos  3.68-4.42  3.66-3.98  867-1,040  963-1,045 
j=2  Chaos  12.3-14.8  12.2-13.3  1,038-1,246  1,153-1,252 
V=500  Chaos  6.73-8.08  6.7-7.27  475-570  527-572 
V=2000  Chaos  6.73-8.08  6.7-7.27  1,898-2,277   2,108-2,287 The Dynamics of Television Advertising  17 
 
s=0.5  Chaos  12.3-14.76  12.25-13.29  519-623  577-626 
s=2  Chaos  3.69-4.42  3.67-3.98  1,733-2,080  1,925-2,090 
w=0.05  Chaos  4.89-5.83  4.87-5.27  1,029-1,226  1,138-1,232 
w=0.2  Chaos  22.99-28.08  22.86-25.02  748-913  839-918 
q=0.2  Chaos  10.61-12.57  10.56-11.51  875-1,037  956-1,041 
q=0.5  Chaos  2.38-3.05  2.37-2.53  1,148-1,468  1,382-1,478 
rR=0.5  Chaos  9.58-10.82  9.51-9.51  708-800  806-806 
rR=0.9  Chaos  5.75-7.03  5.72-6.39  1,090-1,334  1,198-1,340 
rL=0.25  Chaos  6.74-8.56  6.72-7.99  896-1,138  960-1,141 
rL=0.9  Chaos  6.73-7.30  6.38-6.67  1,051-1,139  1,149-1,202 
 
Table 1 – Sensitivity analysis. 
 
In  table  1,  we  have  advertising  time  results  and  optimal  revenues  for  several 
combinations of parameters. The first case considers our benchmark vector of parameter 
values that was characterized graphically. All the other 22 cases are studied for a change 
in one of the parameter values, maintaining all the rest in its original values. Recall that 
in the benchmark case we have chaotic dynamics, and only four parameters can change 
qualitatively  this  result,  which  are  the  parameters  in  equation  (7),  an  equation  that 
defines the movement over time of consumers’ preferences.  
Therefore, a first straightforward conclusion from the table is that any change in 
parameters, except in b, m, m or n, will not modify the qualitative dynamic nature of our 
problem; this is why the last 14 cases in the table continue to respect to a situation of 
chaotic  motion.  For  changes  in  the  values  of  the  referred  four  parameters,  we  can 
abandon chaos and have various types of periodic motion and fixed point stability. For 
the advanced examples, notice that three cases of fixed point are presented, along with 
one case of period 2 cycles, two cases of period 3 cycles and one case of cycles of 
period 6.  
Although studying a set of possible cases does not allow for universal conclusions, 
an important regularity is found for every studied example. In all cases, from fixed point 
stability, to cycles or chaos, one finds the same result as in the benchmark case: ad 
addressability implies higher long term profits and less advertising time. As in figures 
11 and 12, in every case there is a positive relation between ad time under the two 
assumptions  (the  addressability  and  non  addressability  assumptions)  and  between The Dynamics of Television Advertising  18 
 
optimal revenues under the two assumptions. This relation is always found for a higher 
ad time under non addressability and for a higher level of profits under addressability 
(these higher values appear in the columns in grey).  
Hence, all the proposed examples give rise to a same set of conclusions regarding 
the basic features of the long term behaviour of the variables of the advertising model, 
despite the different qualitative behaviour implied by the evolution of preferences.  
Note, in the table, that in the case of cycles with identifiable order, each value in 
the column relating non addressability corresponds to the value in the same position in 
the column of addressability (both for ad time and revenues); in the case of chaotic 
motion,  we  present  an  interval  in  which  the  fluctuation  is  bounded,  and  there  is  a 
positive relation between the two sets of addressability – non addressability values. 
Our  main  conclusion  is  that  although  the  model  is  not  robust  to  changes  in 
parameter values regarding the qualitative long term dynamic behaviour, it seems robust 
to changes in the values of parameters in what concerns the main implications of the 
possibility of targeting commercials.  
 
6. A Further Insight 
 
In the KW model, besides product preference heterogeneity, program preference 
heterogeneity is also discussed. Consider that networks specialize in one of two types of 
programs (type 1 and type 2). Let bRt and 1-bRt be the shares of RH viewers who prefer 
type 1 and type 2 programs, respectively, and let bLt and 1-bLt be the shares of LH 
viewers who prefer type 1 and type 2 programs, respectively. 
In this section we adopt this environment to understand how consumer / viewer 
heterogeneity are combined in determining long term endogenous changes on audience 
shares. Thus, there is an important change on focus. We are no longer worried with an 
individual network profits but with the relation between audiences of different types of 
networks  (between  networks  of  the  same  type,  the  same  competitive  scenario  of 
previous sections continues to hold).  
If  Lt t Rt t t b a b a g × - + × = ) 1 (  is the share of audience for programs of type 1 and 
if ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 Lt t Rt t t b a b a g - × - + - × = -  is the share of audience for programs of type 
2,  we  can  study  the  long  term  behaviour  of  the  audiences  ratio,  ) 1 ( t t g g - .  To 
accomplish this, we assume that preferences for programs are determined by the same 
factors that determine the preferences for products: imitation – I will like what others The Dynamics of Television Advertising  19 
 
like; conspicuous behaviour – if all the others prefer program 1, I will try program 2; 
and cumulative utility / disutility – utility withdrawn from one program does not have to 
remain still over time. 
Therefore, in a parallel way to (7), one may consider (11) and (12), 
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Parameters mR and mL can possess positive or negative values. All other parameters in 
(11) and (12) are positive quantities. 
Combining (7), (11) and (12), multiple possibilities regarding dynamic outcomes 
arise. To illustrate some of these possibilities we consider the same set of parameter 
values as in previous sections plus the following vectors: [bR mR nR mR]=[5.5 2 1 -0.25] 
and [bL mL nL mL]=[3.3 1 3 0.1]. For these values, one may present the evolution over 
time of the audiences’ ratio (figure 13). Afterwards, a sensitivity analysis indicates how 
audiences are shaped by changes in parameter values. The values were selected in order 
to get chaotic motion for both program preference shares. 
 
Figure 13 
 
In figure 13, one can observe a long term time path for the audiences’ ratio with 
no identifiable periodicity. The chaotic motion, triggered by the bounded rationality 
mechanism involving preferences over consumption and television programs, implies 
that the overall preference for programs of type 1 and 2 changes dramatically from one 
period to the next. 
In table 2 a more detailed analysis of long term possibilities regarding program 
shares is provided by comparing several numerical examples. 
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Values of 
parameters 
Dynamics of 
at 
Dynamics of 
bRt 
Dynamics of 
bLt 
Audience’s ratio 
Benchmark  Chaos  Chaos  Chaos  0.12-97.4 
b=2; bR=1;  
bL=2 
Fixed point  Fixed point  Period 2  2.47; 2.85 
b=3.5; bR=10; 
bL=5 
Period 6  Fixed point  Fixed point  0.001; 0.0013; 
0.03; 0.05; 1; 1.2 
m=0.75;mR=0.25;  
mL=-0.5 
Period 2  Chaos  Fixed point  1.54-294.5 
m=-0.25; mR=0;  
mL=0.5 
Chaos  Period 2  Period 3  0.1-72.8 
m=0.1; mR=1; 
mL=2 
Fixed point  Fixed point  Period 2  0.1; 0.32 
m=3.3; mR=3.3; 
mL=3.3 
Period 3  Fixed point  Fixed point  0; 0.03; 0.58 
n=0.5; nR=1; 
nL=0 
Period 3  Chaos  Period 2   0.18-214 
n=2; nR=2; 
nL=2 
Fixed point  Fixed point  Period 2  0.88; 0.92 
 
Table 2 – Heterogeneity in product and program preferences: dynamic results. 
 
Table 2 clarifies the kind of dynamics that audiences may be subject to. We have 
considered  various  examples  that  modify  the  values  of  the  benchmark  case.  The 
dynamics of each one of the three preference equations is independent from the others 
and depends only on the parameters that are present in each one of the equations. The 
ratio of audiences is dependent on the three preference variables and the higher degree 
periodicity tends to dominate, that is, if chaos exists for one of the equations (7), (11) or 
(12), the audience’s ratio will also display chaotic motion; if two of the equations are 
characterized by a fixed point equilibrium and for the other a period 2 cycles is found, 
then the ratio will be given by a period 2 cycle as well.  
Regard that when chaotic motion is present, the ratio alternates between values 
lower and higher than 1, indicating that the most preferred type of programs will vary 
over time. When low periodicity cycles dominate, this can imply that one of the two The Dynamics of Television Advertising  21 
 
types of program is always preferred but with different intensities, or that periods of 
preference for one or the other type of program alternate over time. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
As any other firm, television networks must weight revenues and costs in order to 
maximize profits. Concerning revenues, advertising has a central role for networks. In 
the KW model, advertising influences revenues through three channels: advertisers pay 
to announce their products to potentially interested buyers, viewers tend to abandon the 
network if it broadcasts too much commercials and viewers tend to switch channels 
when comparing networks’ time dedicated to advertising. These features allow for a 
straightforward static analysis of the optimal level of profits and of the advertising time 
that networks must sell in order to maximize profits. 
The  analysis  becomes  more  interesting  when  two  scenarios  are  compared:  the 
conventional case, under which the same television transmission time cannot be sold 
simultaneously  to  different  advertisers,  and  the  case  where  advertising  becomes 
addressable,  as  a  result  of  exploring  the  new  possibilities  of  cable  television 
broadcasting. The analysis is also more insightful because heterogeneous consumers are 
considered:  even  if  television  viewers  are  homogeneous  in  terms  of  programming 
preferences, they differ in terms of preferences over types of goods sellers advertise on 
television. 
This  paper  has  extended  the  KW  analysis  into  a  dynamic  environment.  In 
particular, one has derived a dynamic rule concerning the eventual change of product 
preferences by television viewers. If viewers are exposed to a set of effects that change 
the utility they withdraw from different types of products and if a bounded rationality 
mechanism  allows  for  switching  preferences,  then  it  is  possible  to  make  an 
intertemporal analysis of the impact of advertising on networks’ profits. 
The proposed framework allowed for a large set of different qualitative long term 
results that went from fixed point stability, to low periodicity deterministic fluctuations 
and to chaotic motion. The main implication of this preferences’ structure is that long 
term outcomes for the advertising time on television programming, for the share of time 
attributed  to  one  or  to  the  other  type  of  advertiser  and  for  optimal  profits  are  not 
necessarily  predictable.  For  combinations  of  parameter  values  implying  chaotic 
preference switching, the network is unable to know from the beginning how much 
profits and how much ad time it has to broadcast in the long term to guarantee an The Dynamics of Television Advertising  22 
 
optimal behaviour. It just knows that profits and ad time will vary within a specified 
interval. 
Despite the lack of predictability and the possibility of multiple long term results, 
some regularities are derived: first, the expected result that profits rise in the eventuality 
of targeted commercials is confirmed; second, all the proposed examples indicate that 
under  ad  addressability  the  share  of  programming  time  dedicated  to  commercials 
declines relatively to the non addressability case; third, if one incorporates dynamic 
rules for changes in program preferences as well as product preferences, we conclude 
that  the  type  of  dynamics  matters:  under  cycles  or  chaos,  the  most  desired  type  of 
program may vary over time in the long run. 
 
Appendix – Derivation of Equation (7) 
 
In this appendix, we derive equation (7) from (4), (5) and (6). 
Similarly to (6), one may present the share of consumers selecting goods’ type LH 
as 
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Taking logs, equations (6) and (A1) are equivalent to (A2) and (A3) respectively, 
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From (A2) and (A3) one withdraws the following relation, 
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which can be presented as well for period t+1, 
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Now, one can subtract each member of (A4) to each member of (A5) and obtain 
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Making use of (4) and (5), we rewrite (A6), 
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In (A7), the term  Rt Lt Q Q -  can be replaced by the equivalent expression in (A4), 
such that 
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Applying exponentials to (A8) in order to eliminate the logs from the relation, and 
solving in order to at+1, we then promptly reach equation (7). 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Graphical illustration of imitation and conspicuous effects over utility changes. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Bifurcation diagram (b,a a a at). 
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Figure 3 – Bifurcation diagram (m m m m,a a a at). 
 
Figure 4 – Phase diagram (a a a at,a a a at+1). 
 
Figure 5 – Time series (a a a at). 
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Figure 6 – Time series (ut; untargeted commercials case). 
 
Figure 7 – Time series (at
U; untargeted commercials case). 
 
Figure 8 – Time series (Rt
U; untargeted commercials case). 
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Figure 9 – Time series (at
T; targeted commercials case). 
 
Figure 10 – Time series (Rt
T; targeted commercials case). 
 
Figure 11 – Long term relation between at
U and at
T . The Dynamics of Television Advertising  30 
 
 
Figure 12 – Long term relation between Rt
U and Rt
T . 
 
 
Figure 13 – Time series of the audiences’ ratio. 
 